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How to Assess the Real World
Application of a Capital Sentencing
Statute: A Response to Professor
Flanders’s Comment
John Mills*
In assessing the constitutionality of a capital sentencing regime, the raw
number of aggravating factors is irrelevant. What matters is their scope.
To pass constitutional muster, aggravating factors (or the equivalent)
must narrow the scope of death eligibility to the worst-of-the-worst.
Professor Chad Flanders wants courts to ignore empirical assessments of
the scope of aggravating circumstances and uses an imagined State of
Alpha as his jumping off point. This response to Prof. Flanders makes the
case for looking at the actual operation of a law, not just its reach in the
abstract. This response focuses on Arizona’s capital sentencing regime to
illustrate the importance of understanding the real world operation of the
law and discusses the well-established basis in law and policy for relying
on empirical studies in support of narrowing claims.

* Copyright © 2017 John Mills. Principal Attorney at the Phillips Black Project
and an adjunct Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of the Law. He is also an
author of a brief in support of certiorari that discusses the breadth of Arizona’s capital
sentencing statute. Brief of Amici Former & Current Arizona Judges, Prosecutors,
Defenders, Legislators, & Others in Support of Petitioner, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17251 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2017).
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INTRODUCTION
In only twelve short pages, Prof. Flanders has managed to illustrate
much of what is wrong with both the legal academy and legal
scholarship. His Comment,1 published in this Review, is out of touch
with the practice of law, theoretical, and willfully blind to empiricism,
leaving it vulnerable to criticisms based on how the law operates in the
real world.2 Prof. Flanders has proposed that in assessing whether a
state’s capital sentencing statute reaches every first-degree murder,
courts should ignore the actual functioning of a capital sentencing
statute, via empirical studies, describing this information as irrelevant.
Instead, Prof. Flanders would have courts exclusively assess
“conceptually” whether all first-degree murders are death eligible.
His principal argument is straightforward. He claims that the reach
of a capital sentencing statute must be narrowed in the abstract and
that the actual reach of a capital sentencing statute to actual homicides
is irrelevant to the constitutional question of whether a capital
sentencing statute narrows. For Prof. Flanders the actual reach is
irrelevant because it is possible to imagine a conceptually very narrow
capital sentencing statute that reaches all murders in an imagined year
of very unusual and brutal homicides.
The following response to his Comment proceeds in three parts.
Section I addresses the constitutional framework related to empirical
assessment of Arizona’s capital sentencing statute currently before the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hidalgo v. Arizona and the Petition for
Certiorari upon which Prof. Flanders has based his piece.3 This section
also provides important context for the petition, including the Arizona

1 Chad Flanders, Is Having Too Many Aggravating Factors the Same as Having
None at All?: A Comment on the Hidalgo Cert. Petition, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 49
(2017).
2 Similarly broad critiques of the academy and scholarship are by now well
known. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (“[M]any law schools —
especially the so-called ‘elite’ ones — have abandoned their proper place, by
emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.”);
Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 295
(2000); Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010 7:20 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/
chief-justice-roberts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-reviews-more. But see David L.
Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts
of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2011) (concluding
judicial reliance on legal scholarship has increased over the last fifty years).
3 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251 (U.S. Aug.
14, 2017) [hereinafter Petition for Cert.].
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Supreme Court’s treatment of the questions that led to the petition.
That context makes it clear that the court below in no way relied upon
the distinctions Prof. Flanders makes.
Section II discusses the particular history of constitutional
challenges based on cumulative reach of aggravating circumstances,
what some commentators refer to as “aggravator creep.” This section
makes clear that there is, contrary to Prof. Flanders’s suggestion, a
well-established constitutional basis for employing empirical studies to
better understand the operation of a capital sentencing statute.
Section III provides important background on the conceptual reach
of Arizona’s aggravating circumstances and the fallout from the
extraordinary reach of Arizona’s first-degree murder statute and
capital sentencing statute in general. Despite Prof. Flanders’s
insistence on the singular importance of the conceptual reach of
Arizona’s statute, he provides virtually no discussion of this topic and
no authority in support of the notion that “genuine narrowing,” which
he acknowledges is required, is limited to “conceptual narrowing.”
Instead, he focuses on an imagined jurisdiction with a capital
sentencing statute unlike any in the country.
Section IV concludes by making the case that empirical assessments
of capital sentencing statutes like the one in Hidalgo should be of
interest to anyone, but especially courts, interested in assessing the
scope of a capital sentencing statute.
I.

THE NARROWING REQUIREMENT AND ITS TREATMENT IN ARIZONA
COURTS

“If a State has determined that death should be an available penalty
for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that
can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is
an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not.”4 Narrowing is a
“constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative
definition.”5 That is, the statute itself must limit the scope of those
eligible for the death penalty beyond those who are convicted of
murder.6 This requirement enforces the Eighth Amendment’s demand

4 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984), overruled on other grounds by
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
5 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
6 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (noting it is “the
legislature” that must provide the means for “narrow[ing] the class of death-eligible
murderers”).
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that the death penalty be free from “arbitrary or irrational
imposition.”7
The Court’s concerns about arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty are at the heart of its modern8 death penalty jurisprudence.9 In
1971, in McGautha v. California,10 the Court held that due process did
not prohibit standard-less jury sentencing in capital cases.11 McGautha
sanctioned very broad capital sentencing statutes that reached all firstdegree murders and provided no objective criteria for distinguishing
the worst-of-the-worst from those convicted of murder. In McGautha,
the Court went so far as to disavow the possibility of even engaging in
such an enterprise: “To identify before the fact those characteristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”12
Just one year later, the Court repudiated this approach and required
legislators to do what the Court had decried as impossible. In Furman
v. Georgia,13 in a case that would invalidate every then-existing capital
sentencing statute, the Court held that Georgia’s capital sentencing
scheme violated the Eighth Amendment precisely because it failed to
provide objective criteria that would limit the application of the death
penalty to the worst-of-the-worst.14 The Court reasoned that such

7

Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991).
See People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1260 (Colo. 1988) (Rovira, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The modern era of death penalty legislation and
adjudication began in 1972 when the United States Supreme Court . . . held that the
Georgia death penalty statute violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.”).
9 See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 UC DAVIS L.
REV. 981, 987 n.23 (2015) (“[I]nfrequency is miner’s canary for the core problem
identified in Furman: arbitrary or random death sentencing practices largely
unchecked by statutory factors.”).
10 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
11 See id. at 185.
12 Id. at 204. The parties had pointed the Court to the American Law Institute’s
formulation of precisely such characteristics in its recently adopted Model Penal Code
(“MPC”). However, because the drafters of the MPC also acknowledged that there
may also be other aggravating circumstances a sentence may want to consider before
imposing the ultimate penalty, the Court concluded “such criteria do not purport to
provide more than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority’s exercise
of discretion.” Id. at 207.
13 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14 See id. at 239.
8
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requirement must exist to limit the role arbitrariness influences on its
application.
Although Furman was a fractured opinion with each of the nine
justices writing separately, a common thread ran through the
narrowest — and thereby controlling — majority opinions.15 “For the
three Justices who controlled the Furman holding, the constitutional
defect with Georgia’s system in 1972 was arbitrariness, and a key
symptom of that arbitrariness was the rarity with which death
sentences were imposed in Georgia.”16 “When the punishment of
death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally
available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being
inflicted arbitrarily.”17
Justice Stewart famously described the arbitrariness in Georgia’s
statute as being “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.”18 Justice White had similar
concerns: “[T]he death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it
would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably contribute to any
other end in the criminal justice system.”19
The problem of infrequency was manifest in Georgia’s scheme. The
penalty is “so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too
attenuated” to pass constitutional muster.20 After Furman, “to pass
constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.’”21
As other commenters have noted, when the Court in Furman
assessed the scope of the capital sentencing statutes before it, the
Court lacked comprehensive quantitative data about how the statutes
affected death-sentencing rates.22 Of course, there was little reason to
15 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, &
Stevens, JJ.)).
16 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 989.
17 Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
21 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
22 See, e.g., Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 1008; Steven F. Shatz & Nina
Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1283, 1290 n.34 (1997).
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collect such data before Furman. It was Furman that first imposed the
requirement that a state’s capital sentencing statutes narrow the scope
of death eligible offenders.23 Prior to that requirement, there would be
little reason to undertake a study to demonstrate what was obvious to
everyone: pre-Furman capital punishment statutes did virtually
nothing to identify the most culpable offenders, those worthy of a
death sentence.
Nevertheless, the Court did rely on “quantitative data” when it
struck down Georgia’s capital sentencing statute, including an
empirical assessment of the frequency with which the state’s death
eligible offenders were sentenced to death among those eligible. In
dissent, the Chief Justice cited four sources for the proposition that
“15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible were being
sentenced to death.”24 That empirical assessment was reiterated in the
controlling plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia:25 “It has been
estimated that before Furman less than 20% of those convicted of
murder were sentenced to death in those states that authorized capital
punishment.”26
The majority opinions in Furman were also replete with positive
reliance upon empirical studies of the death penalty.27 This data did
not approach the scope and reliability of contemporary Furman
challenges,28 but it was important for the Court for assessing the scope
of Georgia’s capital sentencing statute.
23 See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 n.19
(1976) (“[The Eighth] Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the
abuse of legislative power.”).
24 Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 22, at 1288; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11
(Berger, C.J., dissenting) (“Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is
thought that from 15% to 20% of those convicted of murder are sentenced to death in
States where it is authorized.”).
25 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26 Id. at 182 n.26.
27 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 348-53, 372-75 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
250 n.15, 250-52 (Douglas, J., concurring). The parties also presented the Court with
substantial empirical evidence about the actual operation of the death penalty. See,
e.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 11-12, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (No. 715003), 1971 WL 134167 (noting the Georgia statute allowed death for a broad
category of murders including death by accidental shooting that occurred during an
armed robbery — an offense “noways distinguishable from thousands of others for
which the death penalty is not inflicted”); Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici
Curiae & Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People
et al. at 7, 13-22, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (No. 71-5003), 1971 WL
134376 (dedicating substantial portion of brief to discussion of empirical studies
relevant to the fair administration of the death penalty).
28 See infra Part III.
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The controlling opinions in Furman make clear that the actual reach
of a capital sentencing statute is the matter with which it is concerned.
Perhaps the most widely recalled passage from Furman is Justice
Stewart’s observation: “These death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and usual.”29
Justice White rejected Georgia’s scheme because it fails to provide a
“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”30 And in the
subsequent opinions of the Court interpreting Furman, the Court
makes clear that it is concerned with how capital sentencing schemes
function in practice, not in the abstract.31
The underlying reasons for imposing the requirement of aggravating
circumstances — another point left unaddressed by Prof. Flanders —
also highlight the Court’s interest in the actual functioning of the
death penalty. With aggravating factors that meaningfully narrow
discretion to impose death, “unfettered discretion . . . to impose the
death sentence” results in the “inevitable” influence of arbitrary
factors such as race.32 As with assessing the scope of a capital
sentencing statute, these factors are answerable as an empirical matter,
as reflected by the opinions in Furman.
Prof. Flanders takes the Petition for Certiorari in Hidalgo v.
Arizona33 as an opportunity to promote his view that empirical
evidence is irrelevant to whether a capital sentencing statute narrows
the pool of eligible offenders to the worst-of-the-worst. His article,
however, lacks important discussion of the decision below, discussion
that would make it clear that the distinction he makes — conceptual
breadth as opposed to the breadth of the actual application of its
statute — was nowhere at issue.
The Arizona Supreme Court, like the trial court before it, accepted
as given that Arizona’s capital sentencing statute reached “virtually
every” first-degree murder.34 The court did not distinguish the
29

Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359 (1993); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 659 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 255 (1988); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 n.15 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 907-08
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599, 601 (1978).
32 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 55 (1984); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,
35 (1986) (“Because of the range of discretion . . . in a capital sentencing hearing,
there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.”).
33 Petition for Cert., supra note 3.
34 State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 791 (Ariz. 2017).
30
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conceptual reach of the capital sentencing statute from its actual reach
in the 866 first-degree murder cases examined as part of the decadespanning study before it. Instead, the court assumed that it was true
that ninety-nine percent of all first-degree murders were deatheligible.35
The Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that this state of affairs was
permissible for two reasons. First, per that court, there are other
sources of “narrowing.” Specifically, Arizona prosecutors do not seek
death in every first-degree murder case, the Arizona Supreme Court
conducts proportionality review on appeal, and the capital sentencing
statute limits the reach of the death penalty to first-degree murder
cases.36 Necessarily neither of the first two sources of narrowing
constitutes a statutory source, as required by Furman. As for the latter,
the stunning breadth of Arizona’s first-degree murder statute37 means
that this element of Arizona’s statute likewise fails to provide a
meaningful source of narrowing, a point conceded by the State of
Arizona in other contexts.38
The second reason the Arizona Supreme Court upheld its statute
was that Mr. Hidalgo could not point to an aggravating factor that, on
its own, reached every first-degree murder: “Observing that at least
one of several aggravating circumstances could apply to every murder
is not the same as saying that a particular aggravating circumstance is
present in every murder.”39 Perhaps this is where Prof. Flanders finds
inspiration for his critique. However, the point being made by the
Arizona Supreme Court is formalistic in the extreme: if Arizona
characterized all of its aggravating circumstances as a single
aggravating circumstance, then the statute would fall. If not, then it
would stand.40
Mr. Hidalgo’s briefing before the high Court succinctly rebuts this
point:
35

See id. at 790.
See id. at 791-92.
37 See infra Part IV.
38 Relying on the definition of first-degree murder to conduct the narrowing
function, rather than the aggravating circumstances, also runs contrary to the state’s
own position regarding its statute. The state has been clear: it is the aggravating
circumstances in Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme that are responsible for the
constitutionally required narrowing. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 22-25, Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (No. 01-488), 2002 WL 481144.
39 Hidalgo, 390 P.3d at 791.
40 An amicus brief in support of certiorari in Hidalgo makes this point. Brief of
Amici Former & Current Arizona Judges et al. at 12-13, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17251 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2017).
36
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[U]nder that logic, a State would be free to adopt two
aggravators: one that covers all murders with a particular
feature, and the other that covers all murders that lack the
particular feature. Or — as Arizona has done here — it could
adopt a long list of aggravators such that every convicted
murderer is somehow made eligible for death. Either system
utterly fails to offer a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not.”41
Prof. Flanders suggests this is a hypothetical situation, emphasizing
Mr. Hidalgo’s reliance on the empirical assessment of over a decade of
first-degree murders, ninety-nine percent of which were death eligible.
That suggestion, however, is belied by reality: the (conceptual and
empirical) breadth of Arizona’s capital sentencing statute reaches
virtually every first-degree murder.42 It is also belied by the above
passage itself and the manner in which the Arizona Supreme Court
resolved the case. It was assumed by all that virtually every first-degree
murder in Arizona was death eligible, both conceptually and in the
real world.
Setting to the side the context of Hidalgo, Prof. Flanders’s argument
is that empirical assessments of the reach of a capital sentencing
statute’s aggravating circumstances provide no relevant information
about whether those circumstances perform the constitutionally
required narrowing function. Where the statutory narrowing occurs
elsewhere (e.g. in the definition of murder itself43), that is plainly
correct. But where, as in Arizona, the statutory narrowing occurs via
the aggravating circumstances, a well-designed empirical study, such
as the one in Hidalgo, provides important information about how the
statute is functioning.
As discussed below, there is a growing body of research into the
actual reach of capital sentencing statutes that builds on nearly a
century of empirical research into the administration of the death
penalty. Arizona’s capital sentencing regime is sweeping and has
caused and enabled the influence of precisely the arbitrary and
pernicious factors that animate the Court’s insistence on narrowly
drawn statutes.

41 Petition for Cert., supra note 3, at 14-15 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 188 (1976)).
42 See infra Part IV.
43 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976).
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS AND THE MODERN
DEATH PENALTY

Prof. Flanders suggests that reliance on empirical studies to assess
the scope of a capital sentencing statute relevant to its compliance
with a narrowing requirement is a relatively new phenomenon. This is
only half true. As Prof. Flanders and other commentators have
observed, “other measures of a capital regime’s fairness” and related
constitutional claims have “eclipsed” challenges based on the
“defining command of the Furman decision — that discretion must be
cabined at the stage of objective legislative definition so as to
‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty.’”44
However, the Court in Furman itself relied on empirical assessments
of the administration of the death penalty.45And, in subsequent
decisions, the Court acknowledged the empirical reach of Georgia’s
capital sentencing regime at the time of Furman.46 Moreover, the
research in Furman drew on a large body of pre-existing empirical
“literature . . . commencing in 1930,” which over time had and has
“grown in scope and methodological sophistication.”47 After Furman, a
large body of work has examined many aspects of the operation of
capital sentencing regimes, including, e.g., the influence of race on
capital sentencing decisions.48 Thus, it is inaccurate to suggest that
empirical examinations of the actual administration of capital
sentencing statutes are novel.
Although Prof. Flanders and others are accurate to note that
Furman’s narrowing requirement has not been subject to the level of
empirical scrutiny one might expect, there are a handful of significant
post-Furman examinations of whether a capital sentencing statute
performs the required narrowing function. California alone has had
44 Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 984 (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 244 (1988)).
45 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
46 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 n.26.
47 DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 229 (1990). See generally, e.g., Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Social
Scientist in Court, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1974) (discussing pre-Furman
examination of the application of various capital sentencing statutes).
48 See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 324 (1987) (discussing
empirical study of racism and implementation of Georgia’s death penalty); Sheri Lynn
Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1925
(2012); Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration
of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, &
CLASS 1, 18-21 (2004).
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four such studies.49 Georgia,50 Nebraska,51 New Jersey,52 Maryland,53
Connecticut,54 and Colorado55 have all also had similar studies after
Furman. With Hidalgo, Arizona is now among the jurisdictions where,
post-Furman, there has been a substantial study of its capital
sentencing statute’s narrowing function.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL REACH OF ARIZONA’S STATUTE AND THE
PROBLEMS IT HAS WROUGHT
Prof. Flanders has foregone any discussion of Arizona’s capital
sentencing statute. Instead, he discussed an imagined statute in an
imagined place, the State of Alpha. Arizona’s statute is decidedly
beta.56 Even passing examination of it would have revealed its
stunning sweep.
As the Eighth Amendment effectively requires, death eligibility in
Arizona is limited to murder.57 Although eligibility is limited to what
Arizona deems “first-degree murder,” its definition of first-degree
murder exceeds the constitutional scope of death eligibility.
49 See Amended Declaration of David C. Baldus, Ashmus v. Wong, No. 93-594
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2010); Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death
Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2013); Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 22; Steven F. Shatz &
Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27
BERKELEY J. GEN., L. & JUST. 64, 93-94 (2012).
50 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 47.
51 See David Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (19731999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002).
52 See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION
REPORT 24 (Jan. 2007), www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf.
53 See Paternoster et al., supra note 48.
54 See generally John J. Donohue, III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut
Death Penalty System Since 1973, Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic
Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 637 (2014).
55 See generally Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are
Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069 (2012).
56 See beta, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“A second-class mark
given for a piece of work or an examination paper.”).
57 The Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
death sentences for rape of a child, effectively eliminating the death penalty for all
non-homicide offenses. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Prof. Flanders refers to the lawyers in
Hidalgo as “abolitionists.” Counsel of record for Mr. Hidalgo, Neal Katyal, represented
the State of Louisiana in Kennedy, defending that state’s desire to execute persons for
the crime of rape, a curious undertaking if he is the death penalty abolitionist as the
professor implies. Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. July
21, 2008), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/47.
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As it did at the time of Furman, first-degree murder in Arizona
encompasses both felony murder and premeditated murder.58
Premeditated murder extends to any intentional homicide involving a
mental state more considered than “a snap decision made in the heat
of passion.”59 Felony murder is similarly broad: It encompasses
twenty-two felonies, including felony flight and transporting
marijuana for sale.60 “Despite contrary recommendations from many
sources, the Arizona Legislature has fashioned a felony murder rule
that seems to be the broadest and most unprincipled in the United
States.”61 In addition to premeditated murder and felony murder, firstdegree murder also encompasses any intentional homicide of a
member of law enforcement.62
It should, perhaps, be no surprise then that it required the Supreme
Court’s intervention to mandate a jury finding of, at a minimum,
reckless disregard for human life before a death sentence can be
imposed in Arizona.63 Even after its intervention, however, Arizona
has not changed the definition of first-degree murder or its capital
sentencing statute to reflect this requirement.
Arizona’s definition of murder, unchanged since Furman, does not
meaningfully narrow the class of murders that are death eligible.64 As
Justice Scalia put it, “What compelled Arizona (and many other States)
to specify particular ‘aggravating factors’ that must be found before the
death penalty can be imposed . . . was the line of this Court’s cases
beginning with Furman.”65 In Ring v. Arizona,66 the State of Arizona
took the position that its Arizona aggravating circumstances alone are
responsible for the constitutionally required narrowing: the legislature
adopted aggravating circumstances “to comply with the Eighth
Amendment’s mandate to impose statutory limitations on capital
sentencing discretion,” and did not narrow the definition of first-
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See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(1)-(2) (2017).
State v. Kiles, 213 P.3d 174, 180 (Ariz. 2009) (quoting State v. Thompson, 65
P.3d 420, 427 (Ariz. 2003)).
60 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2).
61 Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135, 147 (2001).
62 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(3).
63 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 (1987).
64 Texas, by way of contrast, has defined “capital murder” to incorporate
aggravating circumstances in the definition of the offense in such a way that
differentiates that crime for first-degree murder. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270
(1976).
65 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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degree murder “which remains today substantially identical to its
nineteenth century territorial counterpart.”67
Thus, to understand whether Arizona meets Furman’s narrowing
requirements, it is necessary to understand its aggravating
circumstances. Unlike the professor’s State of Alpha, Arizona’s
aggravating circumstances, both as originally drafted and after years of
“aggravator creep,” are very broad.
In fact, the day after Furman was decided, then-State Senator Sandra
Day O’Connor approached Rudy Gruber, who was serving as the
Associate Director of Arizona’s Criminal Code Commission. She
“asked Gerber, in her words, to draft a death-penalty statute ‘we can
live with’ — one that excluded ‘ordinary’ murders and gave uniformity
to capital sentencing consistent with [the Supreme] Court’s
instructions.”68
The post-Furman statute contained six aggravating circumstances
and, like many other state statutes, was modeled closely after the
Model Penal Code.69 If one of the following conditions were present, a
defendant would be death-eligible: (1) prior conviction for an offense
for which life imprisonment was a possible sentence; (2) prior
conviction for a felony involving “the use or threat of violence;” (3)
creating a “grave risk of death to another person or persons in
addition to the victim of the offense;” (4) procuring the offense by
payment or promise of payment; (5) committing the offense in
exchange for payment or promise of payment; and (6) committing the
offense “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”70 Even
this relatively modest list of aggravating circumstances lost favor with
the authors of the Model Penal Code precisely because they failed to
perform their intended function of narrowing the pool of eligible
offenders in a manner that would eliminate arbitrariness from the
administration of the death penalty.71
But Arizona in no way limited itself to this more modest list.
Instead, Arizona, like many jurisdictions, fell sway to what has been

67 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 38, at 22-25; see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-1105.
68 Brief of Amici Former & Current Arizona Judges et al., supra note 40, at 4.
69 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
374 (1995).
70 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-454(E) (1973) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13751(F) (2017)).
71 See AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 5 (Apr. 15, 2009).
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deemed “aggravator creep,” the tendency of legislators to make
aggravating factor lists “longer and longer” over time, so that deathpenalty statutes “which might [have] be[en] narrowly tailored at the
outset, begin[] to get away from us.”72
Arizona has not been exempt from the “pressure to expand the
ambit of the death penalty over time.”73 Although, as Prof. Flanders
notes, the raw number of aggravating circumstances itself may not
mean much if the circumstances apply only to a small subset of
murders, such is not the case for Arizona’s present list of aggravating
circumstances. He does not dispute the latter point or even address the
specifics of any actual state’s aggravating circumstances at all.
In Arizona, a person convicted of first-degree murder is death
eligible if one of fourteen circumstances apply: (1) prior conviction for
an offense for which life imprisonment was a possible sentence; (2)
prior or concurrent conviction of a serious offense; (3) creating a
“grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the
person murdered during the commission of the offense;” (4)
procuring the offense by payment or promise of payment; (5)
committing the offense in exchange for payment or promise of
payment; (6) committing the offense “in an especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved manner;” (7) committing the offense while in custody or
on supervised release or probation; (8) the offense involved more than
one homicide; (9) the defendant was an adult and the victim was
under fifteen years old, a fetus at any stage of development, or over
seventy years old; (10) the victim was a member of law enforcement;
(11) the offense was part of the activity associated with a “criminal
street gang or criminal syndicate;” (12) the offense was committed for
the purpose of preventing a person from cooperating with law
enforcement; (13) the offense was committed in a “cold, calculated
manner without pretense of remorse or moral justification;” or (14)
the offense involved use of a stun gun.74
Like aggravating circumstances in other, real world jurisdictions,
assessing the breadth of Arizona’s aggravating circumstances requires
more than pat reliance on games of logic. However, even taking
Arizona’s aggravating circumstances at face value, examining them
“conceptually,” as Prof. Flanders suggests, easily leads to serious
questions about whether any first-degree murder would be excluded,
72 Edwin Colfax, Fairness in the Application of the Death Penalty, 80 IND. L.J. 35, 35
(2005).
73 CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 161 (2016).
74 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-751(F)(1)-(14).
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even from individual aggravating circumstances: what first-degree
murder does not lack “moral justification”? What murder is not
“heinous”?75
Some of Arizona’s aggravating factors are objectively narrow. For
example, using a stun gun is quite specific. However, even some
superficially narrow provisions have the potential for sweeping reach.
It is, for example, very unusual to commit first-degree murder without
simultaneously also committing another serious offense, such as
assault. This circumstance is, in fact, the one most commonly present
in Arizona murders.76 Without testing one’s conceptual assumptions
against actual murders, it would be easy to fail to appreciate the
breadth, conceptual or otherwise, of Arizona’s statute.
Examining Arizona’s actual statute, as opposed to the imagined
statute in the State of Alpha, provides some insights about the utility
and limitations of limiting the assessment to the “conceptual” reach.
IV. MAKING THE CASE FOR EMPIRICISM
More broadly, Prof. Flanders’s approach, untethered from how the
law operates in practice, runs afoul of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
admonition that “we must think things not words.”77 That is, the
professor’s Comment reflects a troublingly formalistic orientation. His
orientation is formalistic because he categorically opposes the
relevance of the actual operation of the law in assessing whether a law
is constitutional. That orientation is troubling because it would
require jurists to blind themselves to information that could challenge
their assumptions and concepts.
These problems are manifest in the operation of Arizona’s capital
sentencing statute. Ninety-nine percent of all murders over an elevenyear period were death eligible. Whatever conceptual questions one
may have about the reach of Arizona’s statute, the reality is that
“virtually every” first-degree murder in Arizona is death eligible.
75 These questions remain even after Arizona’s “limiting construction” of
heinousness. See State v. Smith, 707 P.2d 289, 301 (Ariz. 1985) (“All first degree
murders are to some extent heinous, cruel or depraved; therefore, to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty, a murder must be more heinous, cruel or depraved
than usual.”).
76 Report of Cassia Spohn, on file with the author. The tenth aggravating factor
(“[t]he murdered person was an on duty peace officer”) spans the third species of
first-degree murder (intentionally causing “the death of a law enforcement officer who
is in the line of duty.”). ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-751(F)(10), 13-1105(A)(3) (2017).
77 Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460
(1899).

2017]

A Response to Prof. Flanders’s Comments

93

As the high Court has predicted, Arizona’s unbridled discretion has
created a “unique opportunity for racial bias to operate.”78 “Between
2010 and 2015, 57 percent of the defendants sentenced to death in
Maricopa County were people of color . . . . 18 percent of the
defendants from Maricopa were African-American, even though
African-Americans are just six percent of Maricopa’s population.”79 A
common bias in the administration of the death penalty is a race of
victim bias,80 but Arizona has a race of defendant bias: a Hispanic man
accused of killing a white victim is 4.6 times as likely to be sentenced
to death as a white man of killing a Hispanic victim.81
The breadth of the Arizona capital statute has created other
problems. Maricopa County is a national and statewide outlier in
seeking and imposing death sentences.82 In particular, the charging
practices of the prosecutor’s office there have created an ongoing
“capital case crisis” whereby there are far fewer qualified counsel than
required by the number of pending cases with capital charges.83 A lack
of qualified counsel has caused predictably higher death sentencing
rates, making the now all too common observation particularly apt in
Maricopa County: a defendant is sentenced to death not for the worst
crimes, but for having the worst lawyer.84
In light of these problems, it should then be no surprise that,
particularly with regards to the application of the Eighth Amendment’s
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Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, TOO BROKEN TO FIX: PART I, at 11-12 (Aug. 2016),
http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FPP-TooBroken.pdf.
80 Johnson et al., supra note 48, at 1941 (reporting race of victim disparities in
Delaware and eight other states).
81 See Ernie Thomson, Discrimination and the Death Penalty in Arizona, 22 CRIM.
JUST. REV. 65, 73 (1997).
82 See RICHARD C. DIETER, THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY OF COUNTIES
PRODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS COST TO ALL, at 21-22 (Oct. 2013),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf (“On a per capita basis
Maricopa County had four times as many cases pending as Los Angeles, California,
and Harris County (Houston), Texas, both known for their high use of capital
punishment.”); FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, supra note 79, at 8 (noting Maricopa
County’s “rate of death sentencing per 100 homicides is approximately 2.3 times
higher than the rest of Arizona”).
83 Christopher Dupont & Larry Hammond, Capital Case Crisis in Maricopa County,
Arizona: A Response from the Defense, 95 JUDICATURE 216, 217-19 (2012); Michael Kiefer,
Maricopa County Runs Out of Death-Penalty Defense Attorneys, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 22,
2017),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/03/26/
death-penalty-cases-maricopa-county-attorney-bill-montgomery/99238852.
84 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
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protections against cruel and unusual punishments, courts do not
engage in formalistic inquiry. They are concerned with the actual
operation of the law.85
But perhaps Prof. Flanders’s complaint is much, much smaller.
Perhaps it is simply that some sample sizes are not representative.
After all, he posits a year in which the only homicides for an entire
state were each either preceded by three weeks of torture or were
committed along with twenty-six other homicides. Sampling problems
are dealt with in all manner of areas of scientific inquiry, and is a
problem readily addressed via the rules of evidence.86 Indeed, a study
that used Prof. Flanders’s anomalous year as a sample set would
undoubtedly be excluded under existing law.87 As the many empirical
studies of the death penalty demonstrate, using a representative
sample set is no barrier to the empirical enterprise. We need not throw
out the empirical baby with the bath water.
My hope is that persons making decisions about the wisdom and
constitutionality of any social program would want to examine how
that program is operating in the real world. My concern with Prof.
Flanders’s position is that he would have decisionmakers set such
information aside, substituting their own intuition for facts on the
ground.

85 See Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (“[I]n
passing upon constitutional questions the court has regard to substance and not to
mere matters of form and . . . the [statute] must be tested by its operation and
effect.”); supra notes 4-31 and accompanying text.
86 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
87 See id.

